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IV 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE ISSUES IN THIS 
APPEAL IS CORRECTNESS, NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Because the parties to this appeal disagree about the appropriate standard of review 
for each of the Issues, Angel Investors, LLC (" Angel") has included in its Reply Brief 
this more in-depth discussion of the standards of review. 
A. A Court's Grant of a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Without 
Allowing Discovery is Reviewed for Correctness, Not Abuse of 
Discretion 
While the Defendants may be correct that the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion made 
in response to a motion for summary judgment is reviewed using an abuse of discretion 
standard, see Brief of Appellees at 3, this is not the appropriate standard of review when 
the request for additional discovery is made in response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss. Here, the appropriate standard is correctness. See Brief of Appellant at 1-2. 
Although Angel's request for additional discovery was initially labeled as a motion 
pursuant to Rule 56(f), the label a party uses to name its motion is not dispositive. 
Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 6n. l , 122 P.3d 622. Rather, as discussed in more 
detail below, the court considers the content and context of the motion in order to 
determine the motion's true nature. See id. Here, the content and context of the motion 
reveal that Angel's request for additional discovery was made in response to a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and was in fact 
made so early in the litigation that no discovery had yet been conducted. See Brief of 
1 
Appellant, Addendum E at ^ 4-5. Thus, it is not appropriate to review the court's denial 
of Angel's discovery request pursuant to the standards of Rule 56. 
Instead, the standards of Rule 12(b)(1) must apply, and a dismissal pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness. 
Canfield, 2005 UT 60 at f^ 6 n. 1. The essential consideration here is whether the district 
court properly granted the motion to dismiss when it considered affidavits attached in 
support of the motion but denied Angel the opportunity to conduct the discovery 
necessary to rebut those affidavits. Without this discovery, Angel could not effectively 
respond to the motion to dismiss. 
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is not abuse of discretion, but 
correctness. 
B. A Court's Determination of a Derivative Plaintiffs Standing under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 is Reviewed for Correctness 
Although Angel and Defendants agree that the district court granted the motion to 
dismiss because it determined that Angel lacked standing under Rule 23.1 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties disagree as to the standard of review that should be 
applied to that determination. Compare Brief of Appellant at 1-2 (advocating a 
correctness standard of review) with Brief of Appellees at 1-2 (advocating an abuse of 
discretion standard of review). Utah law supports Angel's position. 
Under Utah law, the determination of whether a derivative plaintiff has standing 
under Rule 23.1 is primarily a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness, not 
abuse of discretion. See LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners Assoc., 2003 
2 
UT App. 377, f 8, 80 P.3d 569 (reviewing a Rule 23.1 standing determination and stating 
that the question of whether a party has standing is primarily a question of law); cf. Brief 
of Appellees at 1-2 (relying on cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, as well as the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals). Even the district court in its Ruling recognized that "[t]he 
determination of whether a party has standing 'is primarily a question of law, although 
there may be factual findings that bear on the issue."' Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 
6 (quoting LeVanger, 2003 UT App. 377 at f 8). 
In LeVanger, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the determination of a derivative 
plaintiffs standing under Rule 23.1, and explained: 
[T]he question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request 
a particular relief is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual 
findings that bear on the issue. We will review such factual determinations made 
by a trial court with deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Because of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying 
standing, we will closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set 
of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the 
trial court. Id. at 938, 939. 
LeVanger, 2003 UT App. 377 at f 8 (quoting Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 
P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997)) (emphasis added). 
Significantly, the standing determination being reviewed in LeVanger was made at 
trial following an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing under Rule 23.1, LeVanger, 
2003 UT App. 377 at f 6; the use of a less deferential standard of review is even more 
essential where, as here, the standing determination was made early in the litigation 
process, without any discovery, upon a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, Jones v. Barlow, 
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2007 UT 20, t 12, 154 P.3d 808, and a dismissal pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness, see Canfield, 2005 UT 60 
at1f6n. l , t 10. 
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is not abuse of discretion, but 
correctness. 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS WITHOUT ALLOWING ANGEL TIME TO CONDUCT 
RELEVANT DISCOVERY 
The district court granted the motion to dismiss without allowing Angel time to 
conduct discovery because Angel's discovery request was identified as a Rule 56(f) 
motion, and the court concluded that Rule 56 was inapplicable to Rule 12(b)(1) motions 
to dismiss. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 3-4, 6. This denial of discovery was 
error, however, because it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. While it 
is true that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is not automatically converted into a summary 
judgment motion simply because affidavits are attached, see Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 
UT 16, Tf 20, 40 P.3d 632, this principle does not foreclose a plaintiffs request for time to 
conduct discovery. 
In support of its position, Angel cited in its Brief Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Inc., 
2003 UT App. 388, 81 P.3d 769, and Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 
1221 (10th Cir. 2001). Defendants challenge Angel's reliance on these cases, correctly 
noting that because discovery was allowed in these cases, the courts did not reach the 
issue of whether it would have been error to deny a request for discovery. See Brief of 
Appellees at 40. But the fact that discovery was allowed in those cases is exactly the 
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point. Angel cited Coombs and Stuart because these cases establish that it is not 
necessary to convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion in 
order to consider and ultimately grant a request for time to conduct discovery. Both 
Coombs and Stuart involved motions to dismiss under Rule 12 which were not converted 
into summary judgment motions, and yet in both cases, the courts allowed the parties to 
conduct discovery before ruling on the motions to dismiss. Coombs, 2003 UT App. 388 
at fflj 7-8 (ruling on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss); Stuart, 271 F.3d at 1225 (ruling 
on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss). 
In the end, Defendants encourage this Court to exalt form over function when they 
argue that the district court properly denied Angel's request for discovery simply because 
it was labeled as a Rule 56(f) motion. This argument ignores the fact that the label a 
party uses to name its motion is not dispositive; despite the parties' interpretation of a 
motion, the court is free to consider both the content and context of the motion in order to 
determine the motion's true nature. See Canfield v. Lay ton City, 2005 UT 60, f^ 6 n.l, 122 
P.3d 622. 
Moreover, the two cases relied upon by Defendants - Wheeler v. McPherson and 
Spoons v. Lewis - simply do not support the position of Defendants or the district court. 
In both cases, this Court upheld the denial of a plaintiff s Rule 56(f) discovery request 
made in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss not because the request had been 
made pursuant to Rule 56, but because in each case, the plaintiff had already conceded 
the essential facts upon which the motion to dismiss was made. Thus, no discovery was 
needed. 
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For example, in Wheeler, this Court made its holding clear when it stated, 
'Therefore, because plaintiffs admit the very facts necessary to dispose of their 
suit. . ., we rule that the district court did not err by denying plaintiffs' discovery 
request." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, t20, 40 P.3d 632 (emphasis added). And 
in Spoons, this Court noted that the plaintiff had openly admitted the facts upon which the 
motion to dismiss was based and then stated that under these circumstances, the plaintiff 
"therefore cannot complain that the district court's treatment of the motion prevented 
her from rebutting the evidence." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, ^ 5, 987 P.2d 36 
(emphasis added). 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Wheeler and Spoons, however, Angel has not admitted the 
essential facts upon which the Defendants' motion to dismiss was made, and the district 
court's denial of Angel's motion for time to conduct discovery prevented Angel from 
rebutting the evidence outside the pleadings which was considered by the court. 
Defendants presented, and the district court considered, nineteen affidavits in support of 
the motion to dismiss, and without the opportunity to conduct discovery or to create a 
record of any kind, Angel was unable to rebut this evidence or "present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify" its position. See Wheeler, 2002 UT 16 at \ 20. 
In particular, Angel sought discovery regarding the basis for the testimony 
provided in the nineteen affidavits, Brief of Appellant, Addendum E at f^ 7, the 
knowledge of Defendants' misconduct by other minority interest owners, id. at f 8, the 
percentage of ownership interest of each of the nineteen affiants, id. at f^ 10, and the 
extent of ownership within the company, id. at f^ 14. As explained in Angel's opening 
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Brief and in greater detail below, these facts regarding the ownership interests and 
motivations of the other Xango owners are relevant to the question of whether there are 
any similarly situated minority owners, and this discovery would have revealed that 
Angel is a "class of one." Thus the requested discovery was directly relevant to the issue 
of whether Angel is a fair and adequate representative with standing under Rule 23.1. 
The district court therefore committed reversible error when it granted the motion 
to dismiss and considered evidence outside the pleadings without first allowing Angel to 
conduct discovery necessary to rebut that evidence and effectively respond to the motion 
to dismiss. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS BASED ON ITS DETERMINATION THAT ANGEL DID NOT 
SATISFY THE "FAIR AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE" 
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23.1 
The district court based its conclusion that Angel is not a fair and adequate 
representative under Rule 23.1 on two grounds, both of which were improper grounds for 
dismissal. First, the district court erred in concluding that Angel is not a "class of one" 
and therefore cannot proceed as a derivative plaintiff without the support of other XanGo 
members. Second, even if Angel is not a class of one and other XanGo members are 
similarly situated to Angel, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based 
only on a purely hypothetical conflict between Angel's interests in the Direct Lawsuit and 
its interests in the Derivative Lawsuit. 
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A. The District Court Erred in Concluding that Angel is Not a Class of 
One and Cannot Proceed Without the Support of Other XanGo 
Members 
The district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on the lack of 
support for the derivative action from other Xango members. At the heart of this issue is 
the question of what it means to be "similarly situated" as required by Rule 23.1. 
According to Defendants and the district court, at least four of the other Xango minority 
members are automatically similarly situated to Angel if they would benefit financially 
from the Derivative Suit1. See Brief of Appellee at 17-23; Brief of Appellant, Addendum 
A at 7, 11. This is an erroneous - and ultimately unfair - interpretation of Rule 23.1. 
1
 Defendants allege that Angel mischaracterized the district court's Ruling 
when it said that the district court "eliminated" from its consideration any affidavits filed 
by the Defendants, relatives of the Defendants, or employees of XanGo. Brief of 
Appellees at 17-18 (arguing that the district court did not "eliminate" any particular 
XanGo member and actually held that "even i f these affiants are excluded, "at least" 
four other XanGo members are similarly situated to Angel). This is a matter of 
semantics. 
In its Ruling, the district court stated: 
In this case, the evidence before the court shows that six of the nineteen affiants 
are the Defendants and two have a family relationship with a Defendant. As of 
September 30, 2006, the Defendants owned 86.1% of XanGo. Seven other affiants 
are employees of XanGo. Only four of the affiants do not have an employee or 
family relationship to the Defendants or the company of which Defendants are 
majority owners. While Defendants, their family members, and the XanGo 
employees may not be similarly situated to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the 
four remaining affiants are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 
Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 11 (emphasis added). Whether or not the district court 
formally "eliminated" any particular XanGo member from its consideration is irrelevant; 
the fact remains that the district court chose not to include the Defendants, relatives of the 
Defendants, and employees of XanGo in its finding of similarly situated XanGo 
members. 
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In reality, the determination of whether shareholders or members are similarly 
situated is much broader than that, incorporating other considerations such as the 
characteristics of the shareholders' or members' ownership interests, voting rights, 
management status, relationships with the defendants or current management, and 
motivations for opposing the derivative suit. 
Defendants allege that the cases upon with Angel relies, such as Jordon v. 
Bowman Apple Prods. Co. and Larson v. Dumke, actually support Defendants' limited 
definition of "similarly situated" rather than Angel's broader considerations. See Brief of 
Appellees at 18. This is not true. Neither Jordon nor Larson supports the position that a 
"similarly situated" determination is based solely on who would benefit from the 
derivative claims. 
In Jordon the court considered the other shareholders' ownership interests and 
voting rights in determining whether any shareholders were similarly situated to the 
derivative plaintiff. While the derivative plaintiff in Jordon may (or may not) have been 
the only party who would benefit from the derivative claims, the court did not rely on or 
even mention this criteria when it determined that the derivative plaintiff had standing as 
a "class of one" under Rule 23.1. Instead, the court in Jordon emphasized that in a case 
such as the case before it where oppression and mismanagement were alleged, the 
existence of any stock voting arrangement which alters the power structure of the 
corporation is "[c]learly important." Jordon v. Bowman Apple Prods. Co., 728 F. Supp. 
409, 413 (W.D. Va. 1990). Because the derivative plaintiff in that case was the only 
shareholder who had not entered into a voting-trust agreement which gave voting control 
9 
of the stock to the corporate president, the court concluded that no other shareholders 
were similarly situated and the derivative plaintiff was a legitimate class of one. Id. 
More important, in Larson, the court considered the other shareholders' 
relationship with the defendants as well as their motivation in opposing the derivative 
suit. While the derivative plaintiff in Larson may (or may not) have been the only party 
who would benefit from the derivative claims, the court did not rely on or even mention 
this criteria when it determined that the derivative plaintiff had standing as a "class of 
one" under Rule 23.1. Instead, the court emphasized that in that case, the non-defendant 
shareholders were not similarly situated with the derivative plaintiff because they had an 
economic interest in supporting the current management and because their opposition to 
the derivative suit may have been "motivated by individual interests, rather than the good 
of the corporation." Larson v. Durnke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Angel's situation is strikingly similar to the situations in Jordon and Larson. Here, 
the district court found that four XanGo minority members were similarly situated to 
Angel, and all but one of those members have entered into an operating agreement which 
Angel alleges (in the Direct Suit) has been used to oppress Angel and mismanage 
corporate assets. R.238 at 7-8. Some members, such as the Grimmers, also have a board 
position and special status with some management control, while another, the Bederra 
Group, has economic status as a XanGo vendor. R.238 at 7-8. 
While Genesis Group has allegedly not signed the 2005 Amended and Restated 
Operating Agreement, it is not similarly situated to Angel because it has indicated its 
desire, along with the other minority owners, to allow the misfeasance in the company to 
10 
continue in perpetuity. Moreover, Genesis Group was once a supporter of Angels' efforts 
and actually helped finance the Direct Lawsuit before being threatened by XanGo. 
R.211-12, ff6-7. Genesis Group apparently changed its mind with regard to the 
derivative action and the Direct Lawsuit when it signed an affidavit stating that it did not 
agree with the legal actions being taken by Angel. Angel was prevented from exploring 
through discovery Genesis' reasons for now disagreeing with the actions Angel has taken 
to enforce its minority interests. Angel should have been given the chance to conduct 
discovery on these material facts. As a result, each of these XanGo members has a shared 
economic interest with the Defendants and thus a personal motivation for opposing the 
Derivative Suit. 
Despite Defendants' assertions to the contrary, this situation is not similar to that 
in Smith v. Ayres, where the court held the plaintiff could not proceed as a class of one 
because the other owners opposing the derivative action "simply fundamentally 
disagree[d] with [the proposed derivative plaintiff] on what is good for the corporation." 
977 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, the XanGo members who oppose the Derivative 
Suit do so not because of a fundamental disagreement with Angel about what is best for 
the company, but because of their desire to protect their own economic interests. It would 
be in the company's best interests to put an end to the malfeasance, but as the district 
court noted in its Ruling, the affidavits submitted by the other XanGo members indicate 
that the other members "have clearly determined that even if the alleged malfeasance is 
11 
occurring, they prefer to allow its continuance rather than allow XanGo to be involved in 
a derivative lawsuit."2 Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 11. 
Because the other XanGo members are motivated by their own interests and 
willing to go along with the controlling members' malfeasance, they are not similarly 
situated to Angel and it would not be in XanGo's best interests to require Angel to fairly 
and adequately represent them. See Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 231 
(E.D. Pa. 1976) ("[T]here are no other shareholders who are 'similarly situated,' viz., 
shareholders who are dissatisfied with the actions of the officers and directors of [the 
corporation]."); see also Brandon v. Brandon Constr. Co., 776 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Ark. 
1989) ("The mere fact that the other shareholders were willing to go along with a 
violation of the rights of the corporation did not foreclose the [plaintiff] from maintaining 
her action."). 
Angel is unique because of its continued opposition to the operating agreement, 
because it alone has no economic interest in supporting the Defendants or current XanGo 
management, and because it alone wants to put a stop to the XanGo management's 
malfeasance. If Angel cannot proceed as the derivative plaintiff in this action, XanGo 
2
 In their Statement of Fact \ 8, Defendants quote this relevant language from 
each affidavit. Brief of Appellees at 9. Notably, Defendants acknowledge that this 
language is nearly identical in eighteen of the nineteen affidavits, which only strengthens 
Angel's argument that it must be allowed to proceed as a class of one. Eighteen separate 
affiants would not just spontaneously choose the same language to express their opinions 
regarding the Derivative Suit, and this similarity in the affidavits only supports Angel's 
suspicions that the other Xango members are being controlled or influenced in some way 
by Xango management. There is obviously some entanglement here which Angel should 
have been allowed to discover. 
12 
will be left without a remedy. See Halsted Video, Inc. v. Guttillo, 115 F.R.D. 177, 180 
(N.D. 111. 1987) (concluding that the derivative plaintiff could proceed as a class of one 
and noting that to accept defendants' argument to the contrary would leave not only the 
derivative plaintiff but also the company without a remedy for the defendants' alleged 
misconduct); Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 796 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1990) (discussing 
this reasoning from Halsted). 
As the only XanGo member seeking to protect the company's interests, Angel 
should be allowed to proceed in the Derivative Suit as a class of one. To hold otherwise -
that is, to hold that a sole dissenting member cannot bring a derivative action on behalf of 
the entity against the controlling members - would violate a significant principle of 
corporate governance. For policy reasons, minority members must have the ability to 
challenge oppressive and wrongful conduct on the part of the majority members, 
regardless of how unpopular the suit may be from the perspective of other members.3 
3
 Defendants also attempt to draw this Court's attention to the fact that Angel 
owns only 1 % of Xango in comparison to the nineteen remaining members, who own 
99%. See Brief of Appellees at 33-34. It is deceiving to consider the ownership interests 
of both the controlling members and the minority members together, however, and 
separating the two groups reveals that the relevant ownership interests are not quite as 
disparate as Defendants would make them seem. 
As controlling members, the six Defendants alone account for at least 86 percent 
of the Xango ownership. R.238 at vi; Brief of Appellant, Addendum E at \ 12. The 
remaining thirteen minority members own only 14 percent of Xango, with respective 
ownership percentages ranging from .10 percent to 3.3 percent. Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum E at f^ 12. Thus, all of the minority members own percentages of XanGo 
which are comparable to the 1 percent owned by Angel. There is no great disparity 
between Angel's ownership percentage and the ownership percentages of those minority 
members who oppose the Derivative Suit. 
Furthermore, the cases relied on by Defendants do not support the argument that 
the ownership percentage of those who oppose the derivative action is dispositive. For 
13 
The district court erred when it determined that Angel is not a fair and adequate 
representative and cannot proceed as a class of one pursuant to Rule 23.1 and therefore 
committed reversible error in granting the motion to dismiss on this ground. 
B. The District Court Erred in Determining that Angel is an Inadequate 
Representative under Rule 23.1 Based on a Hypothetical Conflict 
The district court erred in determining that Angel is an inadequate representative 
and in granting the motion to dismiss because it failed to first find that an actual conflict 
existed between Angel's interests in the Direct Suit and its interests in the Derivative Suit. 
Although Defendants do not address the issue of this failure in their Appellees' Brief, this 
failure is critical and requires that the district court's Ruling be reversed. 
The law is clear that in order to dismiss a derivative plaintiff based on a conflict of 
interest, the court must first find that the plaintiff has interests that are actually - not 
example, while it is true that in Nolen 79 of the 84 stockholders (representing 96 percent 
of the outstanding stock) opposed the derivative action, the Sixth Circuit recognized the 
difficulty of applying a quantitative requirement to a Rule 23.1 standing determination 
and expressly stated that it would not affirm on that ground. Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co., 
449 F.2d 506, 508 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1971). 
Kuzmickey is also distinguishable. In that case, the defendants and other minority 
shareholders together owned 84 percent of the corporation (70 and 14 percent, 
respectively), and the potential derivative plaintiff owned only 16 percent. Even though 
the court in Kuzmickey found that the potential plaintiff was an inadequate representative 
under Rule 23.1, it did so based on its erroneous conclusion that a derivative plaintiff 
could not ever proceed as a class of one - not because of the plaintiffs relatively small 
ownership. See Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see 
also Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 796 F. Supp. 160, 161-162 (Tex. 1990) (citing cases and 
recognizing that more recent decisions have expressly rejected the Kuzmickey 
interpretation of Rule 23.1). The Kuzmickey court found that no other shareholders were 
similarly situated with the potential derivative plaintiff, and thus, under the correct 
interpretation of Rule 23.1, the derivative action would not have been dismissed. The 
plaintiff in Kuzmickey would have been allowed to proceed as a class of one, regardless of 
its ownership percentage. 
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merely potentially - antagonistic to the other shareholders in the derivative action. 
Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). Conflicts which are 
merely hypothetical possibilities are insufficient to support dismissal of a derivative 
action. G.A. Enterprises, Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 517 F.2d 24, 27 (1st 
Cir. 1975); Williams v. Service Corp. MI, 459 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); 
7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1983; see In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities 
Litig, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (D.C. 111. 1978) (allowing a derivative plaintiff to proceed 
where "at this stage of the proceedings there is merely a potential conflict of interest 
present"). The district court itself even recognized in its Ruling that "[i]f only a potential 
conflict is present, the cases may both proceed; the Court may take appropriate action if 
an actual conflict arises." Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 9. 
Despite the district court's recognition of this clear requirement, however, it 
dismissed the Derivative Suit based only on a finding of a potential conflict. In its 
Ruling, the district court found only that "there may be some actual conflict between 
[Angel's] interest in the Direct Lawsuit and its representation in the derivative suit," and 
even acknowledged that it is "possible" that Angel's participation in the Direct Suit will 
not decrease its interest in pursuing the derivative claims. Brief of Appellant, Addendum 
A at 9 (emphasis added). Because of this failure to find that an actual conflict of interest 
exists, the district court's determination that Angel is an inadequate representative under 
Rule 23.1 and dismissal of the Derivative Suit must be reversed. See Vanderbilt, 725 
F.2d at 208-209 (reversing the dismissal of a derivative action based on a determination 
that the plaintiff was an inadequate representative where the district court issued its order 
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without first finding that the plaintiffs interest were antagonistic to those of the other 
shareholders). 
Furthermore, even had the district court made such a finding, the dismissal of the 
Derivative Suit would still be reversible error because there is no actual conflict of 
interest. As Defendants recognize, there is no per se rule against simultaneous direct and 
derivative actions, see in re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litig., 455 F. Supp. at 
1014, and derivative claims seeking monetary damages on behalf of the corporation are 
not incompatible with direct claims seeking dissolution of the corporation. 
While the court in Neusteter v. District Court did not formally address the 
requirements of Rule 23.1 in relation to the plaintiffs dissolution claim,4 the court 
nevertheless offered helpful guidance explaining that derivative claims and claims for 
dissolution do not create an unavoidable conflict of interest. The court explained that the 
defendants' argument that derivative claims are "good" for the corporation while 
dissolution claims are "bad" for the corporation "extends the anthropomorphic concept of 
the corporation - a person capable of injury and knowledge - beyond the point of its 
usefulness in solving problems involving corporate relationships." Neusteter, 675 P.2d 1, 
8 (Colo. 1984). Instead, the court concluded that both remedies are ultimately directed at 
protecting investments, and there is "no contradiction" between a plaintiffs derivative 
4
 The court did address the issue of fair and adequate representation under 
Rule 23.1, however, analyzing whether the plaintiffs were required to adequately 
represent the very persons charged with wrongdoing, or only the "similarly situated" 
members of the allegedly wronged minority group. Neusteter, 675 P.2d at 7. 
16 
action and concurrent claim for dissolution because of the prospect of continued 
mismanagement of the corporation. Id. 
GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Management, Ltd., also supports the position that there is no 
conflict of interest between derivative claims and claims for dissolution. In that case, the 
Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs allegations set forth a sufficient basis 
- separate and apart from the derivative claims - for seeking judicial dissolution. GLFP, 
2007 UT App. 131, f 13, 163 P.3d 636. While Defendants are correct that the court in 
GLFP did not specifically address the issue of standing under Rule 23.1, the court did 
reverse summary judgment on the dissolution claim and indicated that a derivative claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty can co-exist with a direct claim for dissolution.5 GLFP, 2007 
UTApp. 131 at ffif 12-13, 15. 
Defendants urge this Court to rely upon Read v. Read, a Wisconsin case which 
Defendants assert stands for the proposition that a conflict of interest exists when a 
derivative plaintiff moves in a direct suit to dissolve the corporation. See Brief of 
Appellees at 28. In Read, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did affirm the dismissal of a 
derivative action where the derivative plaintiff also sought dissolution of the corporation. 
5
 This is particularly true in light of the fact that an appellate court can affirm 
a district court's ruling for "any reason supported by the record," even if that reason 
differs from the stated basis for the ruling below. See U.S. v. Hanson, 526 F.3d 653, 663 
(10th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Titan Indent. Co., 508 F.3d 971, 975 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). 
In GLFP, had the Utah Court of Appeals believed that a direct claim for 
dissolution of a corporation is fundamentally incompatible with derivative claims, it was 
free to affirm the dismissal of the dissolution claim on that ground. But it did not. It 
elected instead to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on that claim. 
GLFP, 2007 UT App. 13 l,fflj 12-13. 
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The problem with relying on Read, however, is that the Wisconsin statute upon which the 
court's reasoning is based differs significantly from Rule 23.1. 
Under the Wisconsin statute, in order for a shareholder to have standing to bring a 
derivative action, he or she must "[f]airly and adequately represent the interests of the 
corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation." Read, 556 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Wis. 
App. 1996) (emphasis added). The Wisconsin court recognized that there is a "notable 
difference" between Wisconsin's statute and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (and thus also Utah's 
Rule 23.1), which requires instead that a derivative plaintiff "represent the interests of 
the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the 
corporation." Id. 
Because under Wisconsin law the court was required to find that the derivative 
plaintiff adequately represented the corporation, and not any similarly situated 
shareholders, the trial court dismissed the derivative action, stating that "[i]t is hard to 
conceive of any way in which dissolution would be beneficial to the corporation in this 
case." Id. at 772. And the appellate court affirmed, indicating that the result may have 
been different under the federal rule (and thus also Utah's rule) by noting that "[ajlthough 
a corporation's interests are not served by dissolution, a shareholder's interests might be." 
Id. 
As Angel explained in its opening Brief, the dissolution sought in this case could 
serve the other XanGo members' interests in conjunction with the derivative claims. If 
Angel succeeds on the derivative fiduciary duty claim, the Defendant will have to pay 
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damages to XanGo and these damages would then be paid out to all members during the 
"winding up" phase after dissolution. 
The burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff is an inadequate 
representative under Rule 23.1, LeVanger, 2003 UT App. 377 at f^ 18, and in this case the 
Defendants have failed to show that there is an actual conflict of interest between Angel's 
Derivative Suit and the direct claim for dissolution. All the Defendants have done is 
point out that it is possible to have a conflict of interest between derivative claims and 
direct claims for dissolution; the Defendants have completely failed to identify anything 
specific about Angel's motivation in bringing the Direct Suit or about XanGo's 
circumstances that would indicate any conflict exists. In fact, Defendants presented the 
district court with only the unsupported allegation that Angel is pursuing the Derivative 
Suit for the purpose of gaining leverage against XanGo in the Direct Suit, and as a result, 
the district court refused to make a finding about Angel's motives. Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum A at 9. 
Because the district court did not, and could not, find that an actual conflict exists 
between the Derivative Suit and the claim for dissolution in the Direct Suit, the court 
erred in granting the motion to dismiss on this ground. 
IV. THERE ARE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS WHICH WOULD 
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION REGARDING 
ANGEL'S STANDING UNDER RULE 23.1 
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, there are no alternative grounds which would 
support the district court's determination regarding Angel's standing under Rule 23.1 or 
which would be appropriate for this Court to consider on appeal. Defendants assert that 
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there are other "outside entanglements" and "conflicts of interest" which the district court 
could have considered, including (1) Angel's non-membership in Xango, (2) the fact that 
Angel has not signed the operating agreement, and (3) the relatively small benefit that 
would inure to Angel if the derivative claims were proven. Brief of Appellee at 37-39. 
None of these factors would have supported the district court's decision, however, nor are 
any of these factors appropriate justifications for affirming the district court on appeal. 
First, Angel's alleged non-membership in XanGo is not an appropriate 
consideration for this Court on appeal. The district court ruled from the bench in the 
Direct Suit that there are factual issues regarding whether Angel is a member of XanGo, 
and no additional evidence or argument was presented to the district court in the 
Derivative Suit. The district court therefore made no finding as to Angel's membership 
and expressly refused to grant the motion to dismiss based on the argument that Angel is 
not a member of XanGo. Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 6. With no fact finding 
below, this Court cannot use Angel's membership status as a grounds for affirming the 
district court. LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners Assoc., 2003 UT App. 
377, 80 P.3d 569, 574 n.5 (the appellate court is limited to the findings of fact made by 
the trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of new legal 
theories or alternative grounds). 
Second, the fact that Angel has not signed the operating agreement does not 
support the district court's decision and is not a justification for affirming on appeal. 
Although Angel admits that it has not signed the operating agreement, the district court 
did not rely on this fact in making its determination that Angel lacks standing under Rule 
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23.1. Defendants do not explain how this fact constitutes an "outside entanglement" or 
"conflict of interest" which would support the district court's determination, or even why 
this fact is relevant to the issue of whether Angel could be a fair and adequate 
representative. All the Defendants offer by way of argument is the unsupported assertion 
that Angel's "refusal to sign an operating agreement with XanGo is a factor to be 
considered in this Court's determination." Brief of Appellee at 37. If anything, the fact 
that Angel has not signed the operating agreement supports Angel's argument that it is a 
legitimate class of one. 
Finally, even assuming Angel's benefit from the derivative claims would be 
relatively small, this fact does not support the district court's decision and is not a 
justification for affirming on appeal. The cases upon which Defendants rely, G.A. 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc. and Rothenberg v. Security 
Management Co., do not support the proposition that whether a proposed derivative 
plaintiff is an adequate representative is determined based on this size of the plaintiffs 
stake in the derivative action. 
In G.A. Enterprises, for example, the court's holding was based not on the size of 
the plaintiffs stake in the derivative action but on evidence indicating that the derivative 
action would be used as leverage in other litigation. While it is true that the plaintiff in 
that case owned less than 1 percent interest in the company and only $2 million was at 
stake in the derivative action, this is not the reason the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal 
of the derivative action. Instead, the court affirmed the dismissal because it concluded 
that an "obvious conflict of interest" was created by the "wide-ranging" legal disputes 
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between the defendant and the plaintiffs principal, and that plaintiffs stake in the 
derivative action was outweighed by the magnitude of the principal's outside interests in 
this other litigation. G.A. Enterprises, 517 F.2d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1975) (commenting 
that "[i]n these circumstances, the court could conclude that the dog might soon wag the 
tail"). The court held that the plaintiffs (or at least the principal's) outside interests 
suggested that the derivative suit would be used as a weapon, "to be either pursued, de-
emphasized, or settled as the future course of the larger claims might dictate." Id. at 26 . 
Similarly, in Rothenberg, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the derivative 
action not because of the size of the plaintiffs stake in the derivative action, but because 
the proposed derivative plaintiff "lacked any understanding of the nature of the derivative 
suit and displayed an unwillingness to learn." Rothenberg, 667 F.2d 958, 962 (11th Cir. 
1982). While the plaintiff did hold only about 2% interest in the company and was 
unlikely to receive anything from a damages award, the court was concerned about this 
relatively small stake only because in that case, it resulted in the plaintiffs lack of 
commitment to the action. Id. The court based its holding on the fact that throughout the 
litigation, the plaintiff "remained unaware of the facts and issues involved in the 
derivative suit" and even "acknowledged that her lack of personal knowledge made her 
an inappropriate plaintiff to maintain the suit."6 Id. 
6
 Notably, the district court in Rothenberg had also been concerned about the 
possibility of the derivative suit being used as leverage. The court determined that any 
recovery in the derivative suit would "pale' in comparison to the possibility of recovery in 
the suit the plaintiff had filed as an individual, and there existed a possibility that the 
derivative suit would be used as leverage in order to obtain a favorable settlement in the 
other actions. Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 960. Following the dismissal of the derivative 
22 
The situation here is entirely different from the situations in G.A. Enterprises and 
Rothenberg. As discussed above, here the district court made no finding of an actual 
conflict of interest such as the one that existed in G.A. Enterprises, and there is no 
evidence indicating that Angel would use the Derivative Suit to gain leverage against 
Xango in the Direct Suit. In fact, the district court rejected that argument below and 
refused to make a finding regarding Angel's motives based solely on allegations of the 
parties. Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 9. There is also no evidence indicating that 
Angel lacks personal knowledge of or commitment to the Derivative Suit, as the plaintiff 
did in Rothenberg. In fact, the district court specifically held that this factor was not in 
dispute, explaining that "[n]either party asserts than an entity other than Plaintiff is the 
driving force behind this litigation, nor does either party suggest that Plaintiff or 
Plaintiffs attorneys are unfamiliar with this litigation." Brief of Appellant, Addendum A 
at 8. 
In the end, this argument concerning the size of Angel's stake in the Derivative 
Suit simply illustrates that Defendants have it all wrong. The true beneficiary of a 
derivative claim is the corporation, not the plaintiff, and thus the critical question is not 
whether Angel would receive any benefit from the Derivative Suit, but whether XanGo 
would benefit from the Derivative Suit. Because Angel is the only minority member 
willing to represent XanGo in the derivative claims, and the only way XanGo can benefit 
suit but before oral argument on the appeal, however, the district court directed a verdict 
in favor of the defendants in the suit filed by the plaintiff as an individual. Id. at 961. 
Thus, any danger that the derivative action would be used as leverage was eliminated, and 
the Eleventh Circuit did not affirm on that ground. Id. 
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from the derivative action and end the malfeasance that is occurring is if Angel is allowed 
to proceed as plaintiff If the Derivative Suit is dismissed, XanGo would be left without a 
remedy for the Defendants' alleged misconduct. 
The district court erred in determining that Angel is not a fair and adequate 
representative in the derivative action and committed reversible error in granting the 
motion to dismiss on this ground. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order 
granting Appellees' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). 
DATED this 13th day of August, 2008. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
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